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LEGAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATION BONUSES -

It would clearly be inaccurate to say that the percentage method of
compensation represents a modern idea. Its rationale is so simple that
there must have been instances of its utilization in early history. Be
that as it may, it is a device which attained little prominence in this
country before the beginning of the present century and which has
grown since then with amazing rapidity.1 Along with the growth of
bonus plans in some form or another, perplexing problems have arisen
-economic, social and perhaps even moral as well as legal. The emphasis of this comment will be upon the law and these other considerations will be viewed primarily in that light.
The courts have traditionally, in compensation cases, considered the
relationship between the directors and officers of a corporation on the
one hand, and its shareholders on the other, as being of a fiduciary
nature.2 Some have even termed the relation that of trustee and cestui

1 Europe was earlier to recognize the advantages of percentage payments than was
this country. See Taussig and Barker, "American Corporations and Their Executives;
A Statistical Inquiry," 40 Q. J. EcoN. I at 40-43 (1925). A good idea of the rapid
growth of bonus plans can be gained by comparing this work at 29-30 with the more
recent BAKER, EXECUTIVE SALARIES AND BoNUS PLANS, c. 9 (1938). As the latter
treatise shows, however, this growth suffered a substantial setback as a result of the depression of 1929. The effects of the I 929 depression are also referred to in 21 CAL.
L. REv. 358 (1933).
2 Seitz ·v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 152 Minn. 460, 189 N. W. 586
(1922); Calkins v. Wire Hardware Co., 267 Mass. 52, 165 N. E. 889 (1929); Rogers
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que trust. 3 Attempts at clarification have b.een made by the use of such
adjectives as "faithful," "loyal," "diligent" and the like. However
little helpful these expressions may be, they are important in that they
manifest an attitude which goes to the very heart of the present problem. They stem from a practical recognition of the fact that, especially
in the case of large corporations, the stockholders are generally unorganized, uninformed and indifferent concerning the internal operations of the business in which they have invested. To the extent that
the law is able, it feels called upon to protect them.
Our concern here will be with the compensation of the executive
officers of corporations. ( Cases have arisen in which directors have been
paid in their capacity as such, but they are comparatively infrequent/
The law involving this situation is more stringent,5 although the governing principles ai;e the same.)
As was stated in the case of R_ogers v. Hill,6 "Compensation to an
officer for his services constitutes a part of operating expenses deductible' from earnings in order to ascertain net profits." It is, however, an
operating expense which is subject to more than ordinary judicial scrutiny. There must be a valuable consideration for it. In the absence of
contract, by-law, article of incorporation or resolution to the contrary,
there must be no compensation for services already rendered.7 It has
even been held, too, that without such authorization, executive officers
ar~ not entitled to any compensation for their services.8 There must be
no self-dealing in the fixing of salaries or bonus awards.9 The remuneration of officers is_ voted upon by directors and, in the event that a
v. Guaranty Trust Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1932) 60 F. (2d) n4; Rinn v. Asbestos Mfg.
Co:, (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) IOI F. (2d) 344; Winkelman v. General Motors Corp.,
(D. C. N. Y. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 960.
3 Bosworth v. :Allen, 168 N. Y. 157, 61 N. E. 163 (1901); Carr v. Kimball,
153 App. Div. 825, 139 N. Y. S. 253 (1912); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting
Co., 226 N. Y. 185, 123 N. E. 148 (1919); Bingham v. Ditzler, 309 Ill. App. 581,
33 N. E. (2d) 939 (1941). See also Uhlman, "The Legal Status of Corporate Directors," 19 BoSToN UNiv, L. REv. 12 (1939).
4 WASHINGTON, CORPORATE EXECUTIVES' COMPENSATION, 206 (1942).
5 3 THOMPSON, CoRPORATioNs, 3d ed., § 1841 (1927).
6 289 U.S. 582 at 590, 53 S. Ct. 731 (1933).
7 Church v. Harnit, (C. C. A. 6th, 1929) 35 F. (2d) 499; Wineburgh v. Seeman Bros., (N. Y. S. Ct. 1940) 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 180; 3 THOMPSON, CoRPORATIONs,
3d ed., §§ 1833, 1881 (1927); BALLANTINE, MANUAL OF CoRPORATION LAW AND
PRAcTicE, § 127a (193_0); Boyum v. Johnson, (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 127 F. (2d)
49 1•
8 3 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., § 1841 (1927); BALLANTINE, MANUAL
OF CoRPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE, § 127a (1930).
9 3 THOMPSON, CoRPORATioNs, 3d ed., § 1830 (1927); BALLANTINE, MANUAL
OF CORPORATION LAw AND PRACTICE, § 127a (1930); 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed., § 2129 (1931), See also 2 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 482
(1935).
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single man holds both of these positions, he must not vote upon the
issue nor exert pressure upon those who do vote. Affirmative ratification by the stockholders may be a necessary step in the procedure,10
and, even if an overwhelming majority approve, this will not bar the
smallest shareholder from protesting action amounting to fraud. The
precise form which the mode of compensation takes is immaterial.11
There may be fixed salaries, percentage plans, stock option contracts,
to mention a few, or any combination of them.
The question whether the corporation executive is getting more for
his services than he is worth is most apt to attract the attention• of the
layman. There can be no denying that the figures are sometimes stupendous. In 1929 the combined salary and bonus of Eugene Grace,
director and president of Bethlehem Steel, totalled over one and onehalf million dollars.12 In 1930 the president of the American Tobacco
Company received more than one and one-quarter million dollars in
salary, bonus, and "special credit," though in the recent years of 19 3 9
and 1940 he averaged less than half a million dollars. 18 The three
Warner brothers of the motion picture industry about twenty years ago
were under contract for $10,000 a week.14 This, too, has now dropped
greatly. During the years 1927, 1928, and 1929, Mitchell, chief executive of the National City Bank of New York City, averaged over
one and one-quarter million dollars.15 In 1936, Sloan and Knudsen of
General Motors received over half a million in cash and stock awards.16
These figures were selected because they are outstanding, not because
they are by any means typical. Nevertheless, the fact remains that executives of large corporations have received compensation strikingly in
excess of that enjoyed by the vast preponderance of successful businessmen.17 What a man is "worth" is no more than speculation. There are
too many factors to allow any uniform system of evaluation. The courts
refuse to be drawn deep into such a quagmire. The statement of Judge
Coleman in the National Cash Register case is illustrative:
"It may be conceded that, prima facie, judged by appropriate
standards of the worth of the services of any individual for any
10 WASHINGTON, CORPORATE EXECUTIVES'
J. 109 at 110-111 (1931).

COMPENSATION, 206 (1942). See

also 41 YALE L.

11 That there is no objection to the percentage bonus form of compensation is
too well settled to require the citation of cases. See 3 THOMPSON, LAw OF CoRPORATIONS, 3d ed.,§ 1862 (1927).
12 WASHINGTON, CORPORATE EXECUTIVES' COMPENSATION 267 (1942).
18 Id. 271, 276.
14 Koplar v. Warner Bros. Pictures, (D. C. Del. 1937) 19 F: Supp. 173.
15 WASHINGTON, CORPORATE EXECUTIVES' COMPENSATION 280 ( I 942).
16 Id. 290.
17 See WASHINGTON, "The Corporation Executive's Living Wage," 54 HARV.
L. REV. 733 (1941). Also 32 MICH. L. REv. 672 (1934).
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particular industrial executive position, a salary of $ roo,ooo a
year appears to the average person of average business experience
and responsibilities, to be more than liberal compensation. However, courts are not permitted to be controlled by this test, any
more than by what the average judge familiar with cases of the
present kind, might himself conclude to be adequate compensation. We must distinguish between compensaJ:ion that is actually
wasteful and that which is merely excessive. The former is unlawful, the latter is not." 18
We cannot assume that courts have abandoned considerations of
size. Varipus tests have been applied. Comparisons have been made
between the industry in question and similar industries, between the
compensation under consideration and that given other executives in
the business.19 The ratio of salaries, bonuses, etc. to dividends paid
to shareholders has been a factor. 20 Moreover, it is quite customary to
make at least a superficial appraisal of the executive's abilities and of
the corporation's need for a person of such abilities.21 The important
thing to remember is that the strong presumption is in favor of the
board of directors when size alone is attacked. "We may not readjust
the salary without a yardstick applicable to the particular circumstances
and not even then upon mere differences of opinion from that of the
board of directors, but only upon concrete proof that the salary evidences wrongdoing or inexcusable oppression to the point of being
fraudulent." 22 • The recent case of Winkelman v. General Motors 23 demonstrates admirably the reluctance of courts to find a "wasting of assets"
18 McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., (D. C. Md. 1939) 27 F. Supp.
639 at 653, affd, (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) 112 F. (2d) 879.
19 These tests as well ·as several others are given in WASHINGTON, CoRPORATE
EXECUTIVES' COMPENSATION 256-257 (1942).
20 Shera v. Carbon Steel Co., (D. C. W. Va. 1917) 245 F. 589. Though we
may consider the shareholders as entitled to primary consideration in the distribution
of profits, there is no argument of fairness for saying that their right should be exclusive. "We have long since passed the stage in which stockholders, who merely invest
capital and leave it wholly to management to make it. fruitful, can make absolutely
exclusive claim to all profits against those whose labor, skill, ability, judgment and
effort have made profits available." Gallin v. National City Bank of N. Y., 152 Misc.
679 at 703, 273 N. Y. S. 87 (1934).
.
21 This was done in the following cases: Booth v. Beattie, 95 N. J. Eq. 776, 118
A. 257, 123 A. 925 (1922); Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 152 Minn.
460, 189 N. W. 586 (1922); Putnam v. Juvenile Shoe Corp., 307 Mo. 74, 269
S. W. 593 (1925); Nahikian v. Mattingly, 265 Mich. 1·28, 251 N. W. 421 (1933);
McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) II2 F. (2d) 879;
Heller v. Boylan, (N. Y. S. Ct. 1941) 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 653 (1941), affd. (App. Div.
1941) 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 131; Boyum v. Johnson, (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 127 F. (2d)
491; Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 960.
22 Nahikian v. Mattingly, 265 Mich. 128 at 132, 251 N. W. 421 (1933).
23 (D. C. N. Y. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 960.
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through excessive compensation, though it demonstrates equally well
that this continues to be a subject of judicial inquiry. 24
Most often judicial disfavor is incurred either by failure to make
full disclosure to shareholders, or by "self-dealing'' or by administration and computation of the bonus at variance with the terms under
which it was established. A few examples taken from leading cases may
help show the sort of situations that arise.
The full disclosure problem is illustrated by the Winkelman case.
When General Motors determined to terminate its contract with the
Managers Securities Company, an organization through which the
bonus was indirectly paid, earlier than the contract provision for termination in December, 1930, there was nothing wrong in this per se.
Yet, as the transaction was actually carried out, the stockholders were
left uninformed until actual litigation of an equalization payment
made to "compensate" Managers Securities participants for this early
termination. No mention of it was made in the report to stockholders
for 193 o.25 Another instance 26 of nondisclosure from the same case involves the "reawarding of forfeited bonus stock." The original bonus
plan mailed to the stockholders prior to the August 2 7, 19 r 8 meeting
provided that if a bonus beneficiary left the service of the corporation
"that portion of his bonus represented at the time by the debit balance
of his account shall revert to the corporation." In the bonus plan in
effect in 1929 there is a provision that the so-called forfeited stock
"shall revert to the Bonus Fund." This alteration is present in the
terminology of the 1936 and 1938 plans. None of these amended
plans, however, was mailed to the stockholders nor were the amendments set forth in the annual reports.
The presence of "self-dealing" is regarded in some jurisdictions as
making the contracts or resolutions for compensation voidable and in
others wholly void. 27 Everywhere evidence of this sort is considered
evidence of fraud. In Gatlin v. National City Bank of New York, 28
the court said: "A relatively simple case is presented when the entire
board, or an overwhelming majority, vote, as directors, compensation
to themselves as officers.... Such action is presumptively fraudulent
and voidable at the instance of a minority stockholder, and the burden
in such cases is on the directors to show that their acts were fair and
24 The court there seems influenced by the capabilities of the bonus beneficiaries
though it admits that, were it not barred by the New York Statute of Limitations, it
would be inclined to hold that some of the bonuses prior to 1930 were so large as to
constitute a waste of the corporation's assets.
25 Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., (D. C. l'ij". Y. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 960
at 974•
26 Id. at 1003.

27 WASHINGTON, CORPORATE EXECUTIVES' COMPENSATION l
28

152

Misc. 679 at 707, 273 N. Y. S. 87 (1934).

97-206 ( l 942),
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reasonable." That the court in the Winkelman case was also on the
alert for such an element is apparent from Judge Leibell's discussion
of the equalization distribution referred to above. He points out in his
opinion that nine of the twenty-one directors who attended the 1931
board of directors meeting and approved the distribution received I 5,829 shares thereof. 29
More complicated and difficult than either "nondisclosure" or
"self-dealing'' are the instances where the bonus has be.en improperly
administered,8° where action has been taken which simply was not contemplated at the time of the instigation of the plan. This is ordinarily
a problem of definition or interpretation. Not infrequently it would
appear to be a matter of accounting rather than of law. Unless the
agreements or resolutions are drawn up with painstaking precision and
in considerable detail, they will invariably contain ambiguities. Perhaps
the most important example of this lies in the words "net earnings."
These are generally the basis of computing bonus payments.81 In his
book entitled Executive Salaries and Bonus Plans, Mr. Baker gives
some of the definitions that have been employed in practice:
"· .. income after deducting depreciation, interest and dividends on preferred stock paid or accrued during the year, but before Federal taxes; income after deducting all expenses and
losses, such depreciation provisions and the reserve for trade obligations as the board of directors may determine, and preferred ,
stock dividends; income before interest premiums and discount
charges, but after provisions for Federal taxes and after reserves
set aside for the reasonable requirements of the business; income
after all taxes and interest charges, but before any charges for
depletion and depreciation; income after all charges and $2 per
share on outstanding common stock." 82
The opinions in Heller v. Boylan,88 the recent American Tobacco
case, and the Winkelman case both deal largely with accounting problems. In the former case the particular emphasis of the court seemed
to be on the fact that earnings meant only those earnings resultant
from the manufacture and sale of tobacco, in other words "operating
earnings." 84 For this reason, a reduction of taxes by the establishment
29 .Winkelman

v. General Motors Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1942) 44

F. Supp.

960

at 975•
80 A simple matter of faulty administration occurred when General Motors made
erroneous equalization payments to five of the participants of the plan. Winkelman v.
General Motors Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1942) 44 F. Supp 960 at 976.
81 BAKER, EXECUTIVE SALARIES AND BONUS PLANS 226 (1938).
82

Id.

ss (N. Y. S. Ct. 1941) 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 653, affd. (App. Div. 1941) 32
N. Y. S. (2d) 131.
.
84 Numerous other examples are included in the same case. Heller v. Boylan,
(N. Y. S. Ct. 1941) 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 653.
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of a subsidiary was not includable in the bonus base. The same held
true, among other things, of dividends on treasury stock and profits
resulting from the dissolution of a tin company, subsidiary to the
American Tobacco Company. The Winkelman case presents a wide
variety of problems of interpretation and accounting. Should nonoperating profit resultant from the sale of shares of stock to an affiliated
corporation be part of the bonus base? 85 Should the profit from the
sale of treasury stock be included? 86 Should bonus cost be considered
as an expense in determining net earnings? 87 Did "capital employed"
( an item deductible in part from the bonus) include earnings of. the
corporation currently reinvested in the corporation's business in the
course of any calendar yearr 88 The court answered "no" to all of these
questions-to the detriment of directors as far as the first two were
concerned. On the other hand, it determined that dividends and interest received by the corporation from its affiliate on its stock and
unpaid balances of the affiliate's indebtedness were properly part of the
bonus base.89
The writer has obviously not attempted to give a complete,
rounded picture of the infinite numbers of ways in which "nondisclosure," "self-dealing," and faulty computation or administration can
occur. This could only be accomplished in a work of hundreds of pages.
Even with such a work, the fact would remain that each case presents
peculiarities and individualities which distinguish it from others and
may lead to a diametrically opposed result. The exact phraseology and
punctuation of a resolution, the fullness of a report, the degree of influence one director may have on another-all of these may be decisive
elements. The effort has been to point out that these elements, unexciting as they may appear, are much more apt to· affect the court than
the more dramatic factor of size, pure and simple.
What the future of percentage compensation will be is hard to say.
That it will operate in a greatly restricted field during the present war
is certain.4'0 If this war leaves behind it a residue of peacetime increased
85
Winkelman v. General Motors Corp. (D. C. N. Y. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 960
at 980-988.
86 Id. at 989-994.
81 Id. at 999-1003.
88
Id. at 995-997.
89
Id. at 997-998.
0
~ "But in every industrial country the transition from a peace to a total war
economy means the eclipse of the authority and control of the corporation managements. The managers are being dethroned. In a total. war economy they are not much
more than technical experts. Like the 'specialists' of early Communism, they are entrusted with the technical problems of production; but the political and social decisions
of economic life are being taken over rapidly by the government. It is the government
which decides what to produce, how much, whom to hire and at what wage. What is
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governmental control through regulation and taxation as did the first
one, that field will remain restricted. The bonus device in some form
will undoubtedly continue. This certainly is to be hoped for, inasmuch
as those qualified to judge are, for the most part, convinced that it is
calculated to bring about the highest degree of efficiency, loyalty, and
enterprise in corporate work. 41 It submitted too that, modified as the
new arrangements may be, the same considerations will determine
judicial decisions on compensation prol;,lems as shaped them in the past.
H. Marshall Peter

going on today is not the beginning but the liquidation of the Managerial Society.''
Drucker, "The Future of the Corporation," 185 HARPERS 644 (Nov. 1942).
41 Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 517, 137 N. W. 769 (1912); Putnam
v. Juvenile Shoe Co., 307 Mo. 74, 269 S. W. 593 (1925); Rogers v. Guaranty
Trust Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1932) 60 F. (2d) l 14. Taussig and Barker, "American
Corporations and Their Executives;' 4 Q. J. EcoN. l at 48-49 (1925), make very
strong arguments to this effect. See also 41 YALE L. J. 109 (1931). The contention
is not being made, -however, that the earnings which ordinarily constitute the bonus
base are due solely and purely to the executives' abilities. See BAKER, EXECUTIVE
SALARIES AND BoNus PLANS 227 (1938).

